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Our situation is almost desperate; but there are some
chances of deliverance, and it is these that I am considering. If
at every instant we may perish, so at every instant we may be
saved. Let us then be prepared to seize upon the smallest
advantage.
Jules Verne1
I. INTRODUCTION
At current production rates, Australia will not exhaust its coal reserves
until after the year 3023.2 Although this fact bodes well for energy
independence, coal-fired power plants account for approximately thirty
percent of Australia’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions annually.3
Similarly, the United States is the world’s second largest producer of
coal,4 and more than thirty percent of domestic carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions5 are generated by coal-fired power plants.6 Within the context
1. JULES VERNE, JOURNEY TO THE CENTER OF THE EARTH 219 (Sterling Publ’g
2007) (1864).
2. H.R. STANDING COMM. ON SCI. AND INNOVATION, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A
HARD PLACE: THE SCIENCE OF GEOSEQUESTRATION 8–9 (Austl. 2007) [hereinafter
BETWEEN A ROCK], available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/scin/geosequestra
tion/report/fullreport.pdf. Australia houses 78,500 million tons of black coal reserves
which, at current production levels, would last 215 years. Id. at 8. Additionally, Australia has
53,000 million tons of brown coal reserves, which, at current production levels, would
last over 800 years. Id. at 8–9.
3. Id. at 9.
4. WORLD COAL INST., COAL FACTS (2008) [hereinafter WORLD COAL INST.],
available at http://www.worldcoal.org/bin/pdf/original_pdf_file/coalfacts2008(04_06_2009).
pdf.
5. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of
CO2 Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 446 (2007).
6. Other large sources of CO2 emissions include natural gas-fired power plants,
cement plants and oil refineries. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION
STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, CEC-500-2007-100-SF, at 5
(2007) [hereinafter CEC REPORT], available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/
CEC-500-2007-100/CEC-500-2007-100-SF.PDF.
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of climate change,7 such emissions are incongruent with the near-global
consensus that anthropogenic GHG emissions must be drastically reduced
and stabilized in order to avoid catastrophic climate changing repercussions.8
Mitigating anthropogenic emissions requires a suite of technologies
and policies.9 Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) “has the flexibility
to achieve [CO2] reductions in many locations and major economic
sectors.”10 Importantly, a type of CCS, geologic sequestration (GS),
simply involves modifying existing technology to serve a new purpose.11
In particular, CCS has the potential to mitigate GHG emissions from the
sectors that contributed to the largest growth in emissions from 1970 to
2004.12 Applying this technology to large point-source emitters13 such
as coal- and natural gas-fired power plants, cement plants, and oil
refineries would significantly reduce emissions14 and align with the
global push toward climate stabilization.15
7. See John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, Climate Change Law: An Introduction,
29 ENERGY L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing the emerging law of climate change); Shi-Ling Hsu,
A Realistic Evaluation of Climate Change Litigation Through the Lens of a Hypothetical
Lawsuit, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 701 (2008) (analyzing possible future climate change litigation).
8. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 43–54 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC], available at http://www.
ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (detailing information regarding the impacts
of future climate change).
9. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, DIV. FOR ENVTL. CONVENTIONS, CAN CARBON
DIOXIDE STORAGE HELP CUT GREENHOUSE EMISSIONS?, A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO THE
IPCC’S “SPECIAL REPORT ON CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE & STORAGE” 1 (2006) [hereinafter
UNEP], available at http://www.unep.org/DEC/docs/CCS_guide.pdf.
10. CEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
11. CCS technology is currently used in enhanced oil and gas recovery and
enhanced coal bed methane production. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 261–63 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter
SPECIAL REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_whole
report.pdf. This involves injecting CO2 into mature wells in an effort to squeeze out the
remaining gas or oil. Id. at 199. This technology has been utilized in Texas since the
1970s. Id.
12. IPCC, supra note 8, at 36. Aside from energy supply and industry (where CCS
is feasible), transportation (where CCS is not feasible) was another large contributor. Id.
13. Anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased by 70% since pre-industrial times.
Id. at 36, 50.
14. It may be argued that CCS is a coal-enabling technology. Because coal is
abundant and inexpensive when compared to natural gas-fired power plants, nuclear power
plants and renewable energy sources, it generates forty percent of the world’s electricity.
WORLD COAL INST., supra note 4. An immediate transition from coal to renewable electricity
generation, for example, is unlikely to occur due to the cost differential.
15. As Socolow and Pacala conceptualized with their “wedge” approach to stabilization
of CO2 in the atmosphere, CCS could account for one “wedge” or the reduction of 25
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Despite growing global attention that “CCS could be an important
component of the broad portfolio of policies and technologies” needed to
successfully address climate change at least cost, 16 large-scale
deployment is unlikely in the current legal and regulatory vacuum.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),17
“CCS is technologically feasible” and could significantly reduce GHGs
over the next century,18 but not without a well-designed legal and
regulatory framework.19 Clearly identified property rights for geologic
sequestration in subsurface formations20 are central to such a framework.
In particular, there must be a clear answer to the question: who owns the
subsurface formations within which CO2 will be sequestered indefinitely?
Since private investment in GS technology is not likely in the current
legal vacuum, this comment concludes by recommending two regulatory
approaches to allocate subsurface ownership rights and help facilitate
GS in the U.S. The first recommendation is to follow the Victoria,
Australia model and allocate GS-suitable subsurface formation property
rights to the individual states. Alternatively, the second recommendation

billion tons of carbon over fifty years. Robert H. Socolow & Stephen W. Pacala, A Plan
to Keep Carbon in Check, SCI. AM., Sept. 2006, at 50–54. The difference between carbon
emissions levels in 2056 under the business as usual scenario (14 billion tons per year) as
compared with levels in 2056 if emissions are held constant at 2006 levels (7 billion tons
per year) is divided into seven wedges. See id. Each wedge represents a reduction of 25
billion tons of carbon over fifty years. Id. at 53. One wedge is equivalent to the avoided
emissions resulting from installing CCS technology at 800 large coal-fired power plants.
See id.
16. UNEP, supra note 9, at 18 (emphasis added).
17. The role of the IPCC is to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and
transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant
to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change,
its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. Review by experts
and governments is an essential part of the IPCC process. The Panel does not
conduct new research, monitor climate-related data or recommend policies. It is
open to all member countries of WMO [World Meteorological Organization] and
UNEP [United Nations Environmental Programme].
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 16 YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT
IN SUPPORT OF THE CLIMATE CONVENTION (2004), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
10th-anniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf.
18. UNEP, supra note 9, at 17.
19. Id.
20. Subsurface formations include saline reservoirs, aquifers, pore space and other
subsurface geologic formations suitable for geologic carbon sequestration. “Geologically
speaking, aquifers are formations of sandstone, limestone and other porous rock deep in
the earth. Such rock has many pores and the pores contain salty water, also called brine.
The rock is permeable, which means water can be taken out and CO2 and other gases can
be injected.” Cheryl Pellerin, Carbon Sequestration Technology Could Help Slow Global
Warming (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/December/2004
1214085757lcnirellep0.3161585.html.
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requires amending state mineral law to specifically address GS-suitable
subsurface formations as a new mineral resource.21
This comment’s analysis requires a few necessary assumptions. First,
the feasibility of large-scale deployment of geologic CCS technology for
the purposes of permanently storing CO2 is assumed.22 Second, the
establishment of a regulatory framework with incentives to mitigate or
offset GHGs is assumed.23 Third, the carbon-capture technology retrofitting
of point-source emitters is assumed. And finally, the existence of
infrastructure to transport supercritical CO2 to a storage site is assumed.
This Comment contains five parts: Part I provides an introduction and
overview to contextualize the need for CCS; Part II details the
technology of GS; Part III is an overview of Australia’s activities related
to CCS—specifically, the Victorian model of GS regulation; Part IV
discusses CCS-related activity in the United States and analyzes bodies
of law that inform a discussion of subsurface property rights; and Part V
synthesizes the prior sections and details two recommendations for the
United States.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF CARBON CAPTURE
AND SEQUESTRATION
Familiarity with the technical aspects of CCS is essential to properly
understand the legal property rights interests implicated by GS. Three

21. This Comment is concerned with clarifying subsurface property rights as they
relate to subsurface formations. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, clarifying
ownership to subsurface formations will have the added benefit of facilitating identification of
owners for the purposes of assigning liability for leakage and other environmental damage.
22. This appears to be a legitimate assumption in light of the three currently
operational sequestration projects: Sleipner, Weyburn, and In Salah. See infra Part II.
23. In such a scenario, the government enforces penalties for GHG emissions greater
than a certain established threshold, rendering CCS an appealing mitigation strategy. For
example, in California the Air Resources Board’s Proposed Scoping Plan has indicated
that a cap and trade program is a possibility. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CLIMATE CHANGE
P ROPOSED S COPING P LAN 27 (2008), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/document/
psp.pdf. Without such a mandatory framework, the business-as-usual scenario results in
unconstrained emissions. For the purposes of this analysis it is immaterial whether the
framework ultimately pursued by the government takes the form of a “carbon tax” or
implementation of a “carbon trading scheme.” But it is important to note that the “credits”
conferred to a firm for sequestering carbon via geologic sequestration are a separate issue
from ownership issues surrounding subsurface formations that are suitable for such
sequestration.
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commonly understood approaches to CCS currently exist: terrestrial,24
subseabed,25 and geologic. In general, terrestrial sequestration involves
utilizing vegetation and soil as carbon sinks26 to result in the “net removal
of CO2 from the atmosphere or the prevention of CO2 net emissions from
the terrestrial ecosystems into the atmosphere.”27 Subseabed28 sequestration
generally involves injecting CO2 into subseabed formations for storage.29
24. Terrestrial sequestration is also known as biologic sequestration. For more
information on Biologic and Agricultural sequestration, see generally Steven A. Kennett
et al., Property Rights and the Legal Framework for Carbon Sequestration on Agricultural
Land, 37 OTTAWA L. REV. 171 (2005–2006); Kelly Connelly Garry, Managing Carbon
in a World Economy: The Role of American Agriculture, 9 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J.
18 (2005).
25. For more information on subseabed carbon sequestration, see generally Ray
Purdy, The Legal Implications of Carbon Capture and Storage Under the Sea, 7
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 22 (2006). Amendments to the London Convention have
created a basis “in international environmental law to regulate” CCS “in sub-seabed
geological formations, for permanent isolation . . . .” Press Release, International Maritime
Org., New International Rules to Allow Storage of CO2 Under the Seabed (Feb. 9, 2007),
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1472&doc_id=7772. For an overview
of the London Convention, see Tom Kerr, Energy Technology Office, International Energy
Agency, Update on CCS International Legal & Regulatory Issues, slides 9–14 (2008),
http://www.iea.org/textbase/speech/2008/tk_seeril.pdf.
26. A carbon sink is “a reservoir that absorbs or takes up released carbon from
another part of the carbon cycle.” Energy Information Administration, Glossary: EnergyRelated Carbon Emissions, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/efficiency/carbon_emissions/glossary.
html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
27. U.S. Dept. of Energy, Terrestrial Sequestration Research, http://www.fossil.
energy.gov/programs/sequestration/terrestrial/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
28. Another proposed sequestration method involves:
[T]he introduction of liquid CO2 from ships or pipelines . . . [for] CO2 dispos[al] at
depths greater than 3000m [in the ocean] is expected to sink and form a ‘lake’
on the seabed . . . [however] assumptions that disposal in this manner would lead to
effective [long-term] isolation of CO2 from the atmosphere over very long timescales may be flawed.
PAUL JOHNSTON ET AL., OCEAN DISPOSAL/SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE FROM
FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCTION AND USE: AN OVERVIEW OF RATIONALE, TECHNIQUES AND
IMPLICATIONS 7 (1999), available at http://archive.greenpeace.org/politics/co2/co2dump.pdf.
“[B]ecause of ocean currents and local supersaturation, a large fraction of the injected
CO2 will be released to the atmosphere after a few hundred years.” Kurt Zenz House et
al., Permanent Carbon Dioxide Storage in Deep-Sea Sediments, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 12291, 12291 (2006), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/103/33/12291.full.pdf.
However, the risks of such a method are high and “offshore disposal, where CO2 is stored
directly in the seas, is . . . no longer seen as a politically acceptable or favored method of
disposal.” Purdy, supra note 25, at 22. Additionally, dissolving CO2 in the ocean is thought
to result in ocean acidification. Science Daily.com, Ocean Acidification: Another Undesired
Side Effect of Fossil Fuel-Burning (May 24, 2008), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/
2008/05/080521105251.htm.
29. For an analysis of the legal implications of subseabed sequestration, see generally
Ann Brewster Weeks, Subseabed Carbon Dioxide Sequestration as a Climate Mitigation
Option for the Eastern United States: A Preliminary Assessment of Technology and Law,
12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 245, 245 (2007).
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And finally, GS involves injecting CO2 into subsurface formations for
storage.
GS is a three-step process: “capture, transport and storage.”30 Step
one is “separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources”;
step two is “transport to a storage location”; and step three is “long-term
isolation from the atmosphere.”31 Of these three steps, this comment
focuses solely on a subset of the third: the subsurface formations within
which CO2 will be stored indefinitely.
For GS, CO2 is first captured at the point source32 of emissions.33
Next, it is purified34 and compressed to a supercritical state where it
maintains properties of both a liquid and a gas.35 Finally, the supercritical
CO2 is injected at least 800m (2625 ft) below the surface of the earth
where it is to remain sequestered indefinitely.36 Current estimated
underground capacity ranges between 1157 and 4017 billion metric tons
within the United States and Canada37 and approximately 740 billion
30.
31.

UNEP, supra note 9, at 8.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT,
CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS, A SPECIAL
REPORT OF WORKING GROUP III OF THE IPCC 3 (2005), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/specialreports/srccs/srccs_summaryforpolicymakers.pdf.
32. A point source is an emitter. See UNEP, supra note 9, at 2, 8. For example,
cement and oil refineries and natural gas and coal-fired power plants are point-source
emitters. See id.
33. There are four main types of CO2 capture systems: industrial process streams,
post-combustion, pre-combustion and oxyfuel combustion. See generally SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 11, at 108.
34. Moore, supra note 5, at 452.
35. Id.
36. Memorandum from Cynthia C. Dougherty, Director of Office of Ground Water
and Drinking Water & Brian McLean, Director of Office of Atmospheric Programs to
Water Management Division Directors, Air Division Directors & EPA Regions I to X,
Using the Class V Experimental Well Technology Classification for Pilot Geologic
Sequestration Projects, UIC Program Guidance (UICPG #83) 8 (March 2007), available
at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/pdfs/guide_uic_carbonsequestration_final-03-07.pdf.
Note, however, that in July of 2008 the EPA proposed Federal Requirements Under the
Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic
Sequestration (GS) Wells Proposed Rule for public review and comment. Press Release,
Env’tl Protection Agency, EPA Lays Groundwork for Promising Technologies to Help
Mitigate Climate Change (Jul. 15, 2008), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.
nsf/0/D35B72DFE481043B85257487005E47CD. It appears as though the EPA contemplates
that class VI Wells will be for large-scale deployment of CCS and be required to go
through the UIC permitting process. See infra Part IV.B.
37. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LABORATORY, DEPT. OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION
ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 13–15 (2007) [hereinafter CARBON ATLAS],
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlas/ATLAS.pdf.

567

LOGAN ARTICLE FINAL EDITS 4-25 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

5/4/2010 4:31 PM

metric tons in Australia.38 By comparison, a single “wedge,” as contemplated
by Socolow and Pacala, represents the reduction of 25 billion metric tons
of carbon over fifty years.39 This represents the potential to store up to
160 “wedges” of CO2 in just the United States and Canada alone.40 GS
represents a significant opportunity for GHG mitigation should the
technology be implemented on a widespread scale.
There are three main options for geologic carbon sequestration:
depleted oil and gas reservoirs, un-mineable coal seams, and saline
formations.41 This comment focuses solely on saline formations.42
Saline formations43 represent the world’s most abundant sequestration
option,44 especially in the United States (80–93%)45 and Australia (94%).46
According to the IPCC, worldwide capacity is sufficient to store “tens to
hundreds of years of CO2 emissions at current levels.”47 And “saline
38. BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at 33. Additionally, 94% of feasible geological
storage capacity in Australia is in deep saline aquifers. Id. at x. By comparison, Australia is
projected to emit 837 million tons of CO2 annually. Id. at 9. Tonnes are equivalent to metric
tons; for consistency, metric tons will be used throughout the Comment. Metric System
of Measurement: Interpretation of the International System of Units for the United States,
63 Fed. Reg. 40338 (July 28, 1998), available at http://ts.nist.gov/WeightsAndMeasures/
Metric/upload/SIFedReg.pdf.
39. Socolow & Pacala, supra note 15, at 52.
40. Author’s calculations. High range of U.S. and Canadian capacity (4017 billion
metric tons) divided by one “wedge” as contemplated by Socolow and Pacala (25 billion
metric tons). Id.
41. Sierra Club, The Basics of Carbon Capture and Sequestration 1 (Apr. 2008),
http://www.sierraclub.org/energy/factsheets/basics-sequestration.pdf.
42. Since saline formations have the most significant GS capacity in Australia and
the United States, it is the author’s opinion that most attention will be paid to establishing the
legal framework surrounding them. Since coal seams and depleted oil and gas fields are
typically already “owned,” it is unlikely that ownership questions of first impression will
arise with the deployment of GS in those locations. Additionally, saline formations comprise
somewhere between 919–3724 billion metric tons of storage capacity, whereas depleted
oil and gas fields and coal seams combined account for only 238.5–293.7 billion metric
tons of possible storage capacity. CARBON ATLAS, supra note 37, at 13–15. Note: author
calculated statistics by aggregating the “low” estimates as the “low” end of the range and
aggregating the “high” estimates as the “high” end of the range.
43. “More research is needed . . . at this point, little is known . . . .” Sierra Club, supra
note 41, at 1; BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at 32 (“CO2 storage in saline formations . . . [is]
considered to be the most promising location for long-term underground storage of CO2.
CSIRO, [Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization] universities and
other parties . . . are currently engaged in . . . research on the use of saline aquifers for longterm, permanent storage.”).
44. Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Dept. of Energy, Carbon Sequestration Technology
Roadmap and Program Plan 2007 at 1 (2007) [hereinafter NETL], http://www.netl.doe.gov/
technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/project%20portfolio/2007/2007Roadmap.pdf.
45. Author’s calculations based upon data from CARBON ATLAS, supra note 37, at
13–15.
46. BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at x.
47. UNEP, supra note 9, at 6.
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formations . . . are considered to be the most promising location for
long-term underground storage of CO2.”48 However, “much less
information is known about the potential for saline formations to store
and immobilize CO2” permanently.49
Site characterization50 for GS is of paramount importance51 because of
the risk of leakage.52 A GS well must be drilled to a depth of at least
800m53 (2625ft) below the crust of the earth. This results in risks
including groundwater contamination, seismic activity, lateral migration,
and other phenomena that could facilitate release of the sequestered
carbon. As such, the International Energy Agency says, “potential storage

48. BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at 32.
49. NETL, supra note 44, at 22.
50. Site characterization is defined as, “confirming the appropriateness of a site for
CO 2 storage through evaluations of surface area land use, the site’s geology and
hydrogeology, its capacity to store the desired amounts of CO2, flow characterisation
[sic] in the injection reservoir and the underlying layers, and identifying possible pathways for
leakage.” Int’l Energy Agency, Legal Aspects of Storing CO2: Update and Recommendations
17 (2007), http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/legal_aspects.pdf.
51. According to the International Symposium on Site Characterization,
[b]efore selecting a site, the geological setting must be characterized to determine if
the overlying cap rock will provide an effective seal, if there is a sufficiently
voluminous and permeable storage formation, and whether any abandoned or active
wells will compromise the integrity of the seal . . . . Moreover, the availability
of good site characterization data is critical for the reliability of models.
International Symposium, Site Characterization for CO2 Geological Storage 1 (Mar. 20–
23, 2006), http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/page_uic_berkeley_summary.pdf.
52. The purpose of GS is to isolate CO2 from the earth’s atmosphere for an
indefinite amount of time. Leakage of CO2 from a GS site defeats this purpose by releasing
CO2 into the atmosphere. Although highly unlikely, the release of a significant plume of
CO2 could be catastrophic. For example, in Cameroon on August 21, 1986 through a
naturally occurring event, a:
CO2-rich cloud was expelled rapidly from the southern floor of Lake Nyos
[which is a lake formed over a volcano]. It rose as a jet with a speed of about
100 km per hour. The cloud quickly enveloped houses within the crater that
were 120 meters above the shoreline of the lake. Because CO2 is about 1.5 times
the density of air, the gaseous mass hugged the ground surface and descended
down valleys along the north side of the crater. The deadly cloud was about 50
meters thick and it advanced downslope at a rate of 20 to 50 km per hour. This
deadly mist persisted in a concentrated form over a distance of 23 km, bringing
sudden death to the villages of Nyos, Kam, Cha, and Subum . . . .
How Volcanoes Work, Lake Nyos,http://www.geology.sdsu.edu/how_volcanoes_work/
Nyos.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
53. Dougherty & McLean, supra note 36, at 8.
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sites will need to be carefully selected and managed in order to
minimi[z]e any chance of CO2 leakage.”54
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that the area of
contamination “from an injection of one million tons of CO2 per year in
a deep saline formation for 20 years could be spread over a horizontal
area of 15 square miles or more.”55 However, the IPCC characterizes
the risks of GS as “comparable to the risks in similar existing industrial
operations such as underground natural-gas storage and enhanced oil
recovery.”56 According to the IPCC, “well-selected geological formations
are likely to retain over 99% of their storage over a period of 1,000 years.”57
A suitable potential GS reservoir has two main characteristics. First, it
is “composed of porous rock saturated with brine.”58 The porous rock
provides the space into which the CO2 is injected and immobilized by
capillary59 forces.60 Second, and more importantly, the formation would
be “capped by one or more . . . impermeable rock formations” which
serve to trap the injected CO261 by acting as a physical barrier to vertical
migration.62
Although no large-scale commercial GS sites yet exist, there are three
currently functioning CCS projects. These projects are not utilizing
CCS for GHG mitigation purposes. Instead, each of these projects is
linked to either natural gas production or enhanced oil recovery: Sleipner
West Gas Field (Sleipner), Weyburn Oil Field (Weyburn), and In Salah
(In Salah).63 Since 1996, the Sleipner project64 in the North Sea has

54. Int’l Energy Agency, Greenhouse Gas Research & Dev. Programme, Storing
CO2 Underground 7 (2007), http://www.ieaghg.org/docs/general_publications/storingCO.pdf.
55. NETL, supra note 44, at 27.
56. UNEP, supra note 9, at 15.
57. Id.
58. NETL, supra note 44, at 22.
59. Capillary force refers to the “adhesive force that holds a fluid in a capillary or
a pore space. Capillary force is a function of the properties of the fluid, and surface and
dimensions of the space. If the attraction between the fluid and surface is greater than
the interaction of fluid molecules, the fluid will be held in place.” Federal Requirements
Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43492, 43493 (July 25, 2008).
60. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE FUTURE OF COAL, AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED WORLD 44 (2007)
[hereinafter FUTURE OF COAL], available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal
_Summary_Report.pdf.
61. NETL, supra note 44, at 22.
62. FUTURE OF COAL, supra note 60, at 44.
63. UNEP, supra note 9, at 10.
64. Interestingly, the Norwegian state oil and gas company Statoil voluntarily
established the CCS in order to avoid a Norwegian CO2 emissions tax. According to the Statoil
website, CCS:
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injected CO2 into a saline formation 800m below the seabed to avoid a
carbon tax resulting from enhanced gas production.65 At least 7 million
metric tons of CO2 were injected in Sleipner’s first nine years of
operation and the formation’s lifetime storage capacity is expected to be
at least 20 million metric tons.66 The Weyburn project in North America67
injects CO2 into a carbonite reservoir for enhanced oil recovery purposes.68
Similar to Sleipner, Weyburn is also expected to store 20 million metric
tons over the project’s lifetime.69 Finally, the In Salah project70 in
Algeria has been separating CO2 from natural gas and injecting it “into a
sandstone reservoir . . . 1800m” below the surface since 2004.71 This
reservoir is expected to store 17 million metric tons of CO2 over its
lifetime.72
CCS is a bridging technology,73 not a permanent solution to air
pollution. It is most appealing to coal-fired power generators subject to
represents a relatively expensive approach. [Because] [g]enerally speaking, a coalor gas-fired power station which converted to this disposal method [CCS]
would see its costs rise by 50–80 per cent. However, the Sleipner West licensees
would have had to pay NOK 1 million [$140,870 USD] per day in Norwegian
carbon dioxide tax had they released the greenhouse gas to the air. Injecting
the [CO2] costs about the same, and the solution is more environment-friendly.
Carbon Dioxide Storage Prized, Statoil.com,http://carbonsequestration.us/News &Projects/
htm/Statoil-Sleipner-12-18-2000.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
65. UNEP, supra note 9, at 10.
66. Id.
67. The project is actually “located in the Williston Basin, a geological structure
extending from south central Canada into the US.” Id.
68. Id. There are two Weyburn projects; the first is a commercial enhanced oil
recovery project and the second is the International Energy Agency (IEA) GHG Weyburn–
Midale CO2 Monitoring and Storage project. Sheri Gagnon, Background: What to do
About CO2, CANADIAN GEOGRAPHIC, Jan.–Feb. 2008, http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/
magazine/jf08/indepth/. Weyburn was designed to be, “the world’s largest full-scale, inthe-field study of CO2 storage in a commercial EOR [enhanced oil recovery] operation.”
Int’l Energy Agency, IEA GHG Weyburn–Midale CO2 Monitoring & Storage Project,
Sixth Annual Conference on Carbon Capture & Sequestration 3 (May 7–10, 2007), http://
www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/07/carbon-seq/data/papers/p2_177.pdf.
69. IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme, International Weyburn Carbon
Dioxide Monitoring Project, http://www.co2captureandstorage.info/project_specific.php?
project_id=98 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
70. See generally BP China English, Carbon Capture and Storage, http://www.bp.
com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9012195&contentId=7024392 (last visited Apr. 22,
2010).
71. UNEP, supra note 9, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Dr. Julio S. Friedman, Leader, Carbon Management Program, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, Livermore, Reducing Emissions in California Through Carbon Capture
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mandatory GHG mitigation targets because it represents the opportunity
to continue exploiting coal reserves for power generation without the
corresponding emissions. However, a lack of mandatory targets providing
an economic incentive and the absence of GS-specific regulation makes it
unlikely that Australian or U.S. firms will voluntarily participate in the
costly research and development required to establish CCS technology.
III. THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR GS
Australia is the largest coal exporter in the world. 74 Black coal is the
largest domestic export commodity. In 2005 alone, this export was
valued at roughly $24 billion dollars.75 For Australia, GS presents an
opportunity to reconcile and benefit from their recent ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol,76 rising global pressure to mitigate emissions,77 and the
contemporaneous rising demand for least-cost78 energy production. Just
and Sequestration, Featured Presentation at the Climate Change Conference in San Francisco
(Aug. 4, 2008) (characterizing CCS as “a bridging technology, not a long-term solution
to decarbonized energy”).
74. BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at 9.
75. Id. Amount cited is in Australian dollars. For conversion, visit XE, The World’s
Favorite Currency Site, www.xe.com.
76. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; see also Press Release, Parliament of Australia, Prime
Minister Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 3, 2007, available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/
parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/215P6/upload_binary/215p61.pdf;fileType=application
%2Fpdf#search=%22ratifying%20the%20kyoto%22.
[T]he Kyoto protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) was adopted in December of 1997 . . . [and] provided a legal
framework that addressed the issue of global climate change and
placed quantifiable obligations upon sovereign States to decrease their levels
of greenhouse gas emissions . . . [t]his . . . framework established the beginnings of
a global emissions trading system . . . .
Renee Garner, Regulating a National Emissions Trading System Within Australia:
Constitutional Limitations, 3 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 83, 83 (2006).
77. In 2004, Rosemary Lyster commented that in “[l]ooking to the future, it is
reasonable to predict that domestic and international lobbies will be increasingly vociferous in
their demands that the Australia government . . . regulate properly the greenhouse gas
emissions from the stationary energy sector . . . .” Rosemary Lyster, Common but
Differentiated? Australia’s Approach to Global Climate Change, 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL.
L. REV. 561, 591 (2004). While it is not possible to tell whether it was external or
domestic pressure, it is worth noting that Prime Minister Rudd’s first official act in office
was to sign the Protocol. Anita Talberg, Background Note, The Kyoto Protocol Accounting
Rules (2009), http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/Pubs/BN/2008-09/KyotoAccRules.htm#_ ftnref1.
78. Peter Christoff, Can the Invisible Hand Adjust the Thermostat? Carbon
Emissions Trading and Australia, in CLIMATE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 82, 91–92 (Tim
Bonyhady & Peter Christoff eds., 2007) (“The Australian economy (in particular the
stationary energy sector) is highly dependent on cheap fossil fuels, and further substantial
investment in the development of coal- and gas-fired power stations is intended and
supported by State and federal policy.”).
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as in the United States, there is no federal level legislation addressing
GHG mitigation. Also like the United States, Australia’s prior focus
encouraged “voluntary actions and other ‘soft’ incentives for industry to
reduce its carbon output.”79 However, Prime Minister Rudd’s signature
of the Australian Kyoto ratification instrument as his first act of government
signals a philosophical change.80
A. An Overview of Relevant Australian Property Law
U.S. and Australian property law is descended from a shared English
heritage.81 Just as in the United States, the law in this area is not static;
it has evolved to accommodate technological advances.82 For example,
Australian property law was modified to limit a surface owner’s right to
airspace above the land “to a reasonable height to allow for modern day
use of airspace by aeroplanes [sic].”83 However, there is one point of
significant divergence. In Australia, “‘ownership’ of all land is vested in
the States.”84 This is known as “radical title” or “ultimate title.”85 In
contrast to the American understanding of real property ownership,86
under the Australian regime, a person does not own land, but simply an
estate or interest in it.87

79. JAQUELINE PEEL, LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER NO. 269: THE ROLE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN AUSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 90, 90
(2007).
80. Talberg, supra note 77.
81. Donna R. Christie, A Tale of Three Takings: Taking Analysis in Land Use
Regulation in the United States, Australia, and Canada, 32 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 343,
343 (2007).
82. MINTER ELLISON, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE REPORT TO THE AUSTRALIAN
GREENHOUSE OFFICE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ASSOCIATED LIABILITY ISSUES 30 (Austl.
Greenhouse Office 2005).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 27.
85. Id.
86. The fee simple estate is the most commonly understood legal concept of ownership
in the United States. This estate is defined as “compris[ing] the greatest ownership interest in
property recognized by the law . . . The owner can dispose of the land as he or she pleases,
and it will descend to the owner’s heir at death or according to the terms of the owner’s
will.” ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 48 (4th
ed. 2000).
87. JOYCEY TOOHER & BRYAN DWYER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW 36 (4th
ed., Reed Int’l Books Austl. 2002) (1987).
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Traditionally, there are two types of estates in Australia: freehold
estates and estates less than freehold.88 “Freehold estates include the fee
simple, fee tail and life estate.”89 Generally, the owner of a freehold
estate is regarded as controlling three sets of rights: the surface of the
land, the air space above the land, and the subsurface to the center of the
earth.90 Property rights relating to ownership are primarily a state
concern, and there is variation among the jurisdictions.91 Within this
context, the next few sections will examine Australia’s regulatory approach
to addressing ownership of subsurface formations suitable for GS.
B. Commonwealth-Level GS Activity
In 2005, Australia took the global lead92 in GS with the release of the
Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources’ (MCMPR’s)
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Geological Storage: Australian Regulatory
Guiding Principles (Australian Guide).93 In the absence of Commonwealthlevel legislation, the Australian Guide was designed to “facilitate a
nationally consistent approach to the application of Carbon Capture and
Geological Storage.”94 Since environmental regulation and ownership of
all land is vested in the States,95 the absence of direct federal CCS–related

88. Id. “Non-freehold estates are of indefinite duration and are typically measured
in weeks, months or years.” ELLISON, supra note 82, at 27.
89. TOOHER & DWYER, supra note 87, at 36; ELLISON, supra note 82, at 27.
90. ELLISON, supra note 82, at 30.
91. Id.
92. NIGEL BANKES & JENETTE POSCHWATTA, AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION ON CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 5 (2008), http://www.ucalgary.ca/
oncampus/online/june26-08/ISEEE.pdf.
93. MINISTERIAL COUNCIL ON MINERAL AND PETROLEUM RES., CARBON DIOXIDE
CAPTURE AND GEOLOGICAL STORAGE: AUSTRALIAN REGULATORY GUIDING PRINCIPLES
(2005) [hereinafter AUSTL. GUIDE], available at http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/
ccs/CCS_Aust_Regulatory_Guiding_Principles.pdf. In November 2008, Australia enacted
the Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Act 2008. This is the world’s
first regulatory framework for regulation of offshore CCS. Jessica Davies, Australia Passes
Legislation Creating “World First” Framework for Regulating CCS, CLIMATEINTEL.COM,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://climateintel.com/2008/11/19/australia-passes-legislation-creating%E2%80%9Cworld-first%E2%80%9D-framework-for-regulating-ccs/#more-357.
94. AUSTL. GUIDE, supra note 93, at 4.
95. E LLISON , supra note 82, at 27; see also Garner, supra note 76, at 91
(“Traditionally, environmental powers rest primarily with the States and Territories . . .
[t]here are no commonwealth powers over industrial pollution, manufacturing or mining
which may have provided the foundation for Commonwealth Direct regulation of
emissions produced in these industries . . . .”).
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legislation is expected. As a result, individual Australian states have
been active in enacting, or at least proposing, CCS related legislation.96
With respect to the legal implications of GS, the Australian Guide
illuminates the interstices of a legal, regulatory, and jurisdictional Gordian
knot.97 Environmental powers are shared between the Commonwealth
and the states and territories.98 In the Australian Guide, the MCMPR
reaffirms that “onshore lands are principally regulated under State property
laws.”99 The MCMPR references the underlying concepts of mining and
petroleum law in the Australian Guide100 and recommends amending
existing government regulations rather than creating an entirely new
regulatory regime.101
There is no Commonwealth-level GS regulation.102 Instead, the
Commonwealth endeavored to bring attention to the crucial issues in
designing a regulatory framework: consistency, certainty, and clarity of
96. PEEL, supra note 79, at 95. The Government of Western Australia enacted the
Carbon Rights Act 2002 three years before the Australian Guide was released. New
South Wales created the “world’s first mandatory carbon trading scheme” by enacting
the NSW/ACT Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme (GGAS). Martin Wilder & Monique
Miller, Carbon Trading Markets: Legal Considerations, in CLIMATE LAW IN AUSTRALIA,
supra note 78, at 74. GGAS commenced on January 1, 2003. Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Scheme, http://www.greenhousegas.nsw.gov.au/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2010). On November
5, 2008, the Victorian parliament passed the Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration
Bill 2008. With the passage of the Bill, “Victoria . . . bec[a]me the first Australian state
to pass stand alone legislation enabling the onshore injection and permanent storage of
[CO2] and other greenhouses gases.” Press Release, Minister of Energy & Res., Historic
Carbon Capture and Storage Bill Passes Through Parliament (Nov. 5, 2008), http://
www.premier.vic.gov.au/newsroom/5247.html; see infra Part III.B. In the United States,
California enacted Assembly Bill 32, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006, which states that “in developing its plan, the state board [responsible for implementation
of Assembly Bill 32] shall identify opportunities for emission reductions measures . . .
including . . . carbon sequestration projects” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(f)
(2009).
97. AUSTL. GUIDE, supra note 93, at 26–27.
98. PEEL, supra note 79, at 94.
99. AUSTL. GUIDE, supra note 93, at 26–27.
100. Id. at 31–32.
101. Interestingly, this approach is consistent with the conclusion reached by the
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission [IOGCC] in the United States. IOGCC GUIDE,
infra note 144, at 9.
102. In the offshore context of CCS, the Commonwealth has followed its own advice
and released proposed legislation covering offshore CCS in the form of a “comprehensive set
of amendments to the . . . Offshore Petroleum Act . . . designed to proved an enabling
framework for objective-based regulation for CCS in offshore (Commonwealth) waters.”
BANKES & POSCHWATTE, supra note 92, at 5. The Commonwealth has authority to regulate
three nautical miles beyond the shoreline. AUSTL. GUIDE, supra note 93, at 27.
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rights. In the Australian Guide, the MCMPR addresses the complementary
nature of uncertainty in the industry and centrality of property rights in
observing that,
[due to] the likely costs and long periods of operation of CCS projects, operators
will require a high degree of certainty about access to a selected injection site
before they will be willing to invest . . . . This need to clearly identify relevant
parties’ rights and obligations is a key consideration . . . .103

Guidance to the states is further crystallized by the comment that
“proprietary rights and access for each stage of a CCS project relating to
the surface and sub-surface need to be clear.”104 Ultimately, the MCMPR
advocates thorough consideration of all issues surrounding GS, uniformity
and consistency of regulation, and utilizing amendments to current
regulatory systems based upon established mining and petroleum law.105
Three regulatory scenarios involving property rights are outlined by
the MCMPR in the Australian Guide.106 First, under “status quo” regulation,
CCS site ownership transpires through the use of “contract, commercial
and property law.”107 However, one weakness with this scenario is the
lack of directly applicable legal precedents to guide resolution of “issues
that might arise between owners of the land, owners of the CCS stream,
and suppliers of the CCS stream.”108 Under scenario one, the landowner
receives pore space allocation in proportion to surface ownership and
retains “veto rights to block site access.”109 This results in “costly and
time consuming” negotiations with all parties holding ownership interests in
the land.110 Additionally, the risk of “competing claims” to reservoirs
results in uncertainty in the absence of “clear proprietary rights . . .
relating to the . . . subsurface.”111 Therefore, this option is not the most
efficient regulatory device for GS.
The second scenario is “self-regulation.” The MCMPR suggests the
establishment of a “code of conduct . . . to govern access and property
rights”112 by utilizing industry standards from areas such as mining and
petroleum law, and existing legislation could be useful in resolving

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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disputes.113 However, the MCMPR also notes that the risk of competing
claims and “relative immaturity of CCS technology” render selfregulation premature.114
The third and most appealing scenario involves amendment of existing
legal frameworks to accommodate GS.115 The MCMPR acknowledges
the increased level of “complexity and compliance cost” resulting from
this approach.116 However, because scenarios one and two are not
appropriate for all potential storage sites and “increase industry uncertainty,”
scenario three’s transparency provides “certainty and specifically
define[d] property rights in relation to CCS,”117 rendering it the “the
preferred option.”118
C. State-Level Action and the Victorian Model
Australian States have enacted CCS-related legislation without
specifically addressing or creating a regulatory structure for onshore GS
activities.119 For example, Western Australia enacted The Carbon Rights
Act 2003 (W.A. Act) “to provide for the creation and effect of certain
interests in land in relation to the effects of carbon sequestration from . . .
the atmosphere . . . .”120 The W.A. Act defines “carbon sequestration” as
“absorption from the atmosphere of carbon dioxide by land or anything
on land; and the storage of carbon in land or in anything on land.”121

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 30.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 31.
118. Id. at 32.
119. BETWEEN A ROCK, supra note 2, at 91.
There are . . . existing state and federal laws and regulations with relevance to various
aspects of CCS. At the state level, the Queensland Petroleum and Gas (Protection
and Safety) Act 2004 and the South Australian Petroleum Act 2000, for example,
“provide for the transport by pipeline and storage in natural reservoirs of
substances including [CO2].” At the Commonwealth level, environmental laws
relevant to CCS include: the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation
Act 1999; the Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981; and the Offshore
Petroleum Act 2006.
Id.
120. Carbon Rights Act, 2003 No. 38 (W. Austl.), available at http://www.slp.wa.
gov.au/pco/prod/FileStore.nsf/Documents/mrdocument:4798p/$file/carbnrightsact2003_00
-00-02. pdf?openelement (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
121. Id. pt. 1(3)(a)–(b) (emphasis added).
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This definition appears to cover GS but does not specify it exactly.
Instead, the W.A. Act establishes a structure by which “carbon rights”
are created, registered, and conveyed. The W.A. Act does not address
ownership of geologic formations within which the CO2 is to be
sequestered.
The emphasis of the W.A. Act is not on GS. Instead, it creates
tradable value in biologic sequestration and soil sinks.122 According to a
pamphlet prepared by the Government of Western Australia, “[c]arbon
rights are a potential new source of income for owners of land on which
vegetation or soils accumulate carbon from the atmosphere.”123 This
pamphlet minimizes the W.A. Act’s potential application to GS because
it addresses only land “on which” sequestration takes place rather than
“in land” as the text of the W.A. Act contemplates. This resulting lack
of clarity increases the regulatory and legal uncertainty. It is unclear
whether the W.A. Act will require amendments to clarify its applicability
to GS.
With the passage of The Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration
Act 2008 (Victorian GS Act) on September 9, 2008, Victoria124 became
the first Australian state to enact125 “legislation enabling the onshore
injection and permanent storage of [CO2].”126 In accordance with the
recommendations of the Australian Guide, the Victorian GS Act’s
framework is generally based on a familiar industry model, the Victorian
Petroleum Act 1998.127 However, the Victorian GS Act was created as
“stand-alone legislation [in part] because: Greenhouse gas storage
formations are [considered] a new resource.”128
122. “The Carbon Rights Act 2003 establishes a statutory basis for the ownership
and protection of carbon rights, in order to facilitate trading.” STATE OF W. AUSTL.
CARBON RIGHTS IN WA—A NEW INTEREST IN THE LAND 1 (2005), http://www.agric.wa.
gov.au/objtwr/imported_assets/content/sust/carbon_rights.pdf. The Government further explains
that, “[t]he commercial benefits of carbon rights only arise because of legal agreements
that place restrictions or caps on greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions from industries and
make storage of carbon a legitimate way of offsetting those emissions.” Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
124. Notably, Victoria remains a leader in environment-related legislation. See
GEOFFREY SAWER, THE AUSTRALIAN AND THE LAW 200-01 (Penguin Books 1972). In
1970 it was the first Australian State to enact environmental legislation with its
Environmental Protection Act 1970. Id.
125. Press Release, Minister for Energy and Resources, State of Vict., Historic Carbon
Capture and Storage Bill Passes Through Parliament (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.premier.
vic.gov.au/component/content/article/5247.html.
126. Press Release, Minister for Energy and Resources, State of Vict., Victoria Leads
Australia With Carbon Capture and Storage Bill (Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/
component/content/article/4704.html.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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The new regulatory regime created by the Victorian GS Act was
designed to encourage development of GS.129 Its goal is unambiguous
and clearly stated: it endeavors to “facilitate and regulate the injection of
greenhouse gas substances into underground geological formations for
the purpose of permanent storage of those gases . . . .”130 Most importantly,
two important issues are resolved in the Victorian GS Act. First, it
defines “underground geological storage formation,” and second, it
provides for clear allocation of property rights in subsurface formations.131
The choice of a flexible definition of subsurface formations reflects
the Victorian government’s forward-looking approach. The Victorian
GS Act increases regulatory certainty because it clearly identifies and
defines “underground geological storage formation.”132 The definition
includes “any seal or reservoir of an underground geological formation”
and “any associated geological attributes or features of an underground
geological formation.”133 Because storage formations are considered a
new resource, this definition facilitates a certain flexibility of interpretation.
This definition is clear and specific yet allows for unanticipated future
changes or technological advances.
Ownership of subsurface formations is unequivocally allocated to the
Crown by the Victorian GS Act. The text reads, “the Crown owns all
underground geological storage formations below the surface of any
land in Victoria.”134 Because title to all Australian land is vested in the
states135 and all third parties with interests in land are merely tenants,136
129. Vict. Parl. Deb. (Hansard), Legis. Assemb. 56th Parl., 1st Sess., (2008) 3674
(Batchelor, Minister for Energy and Resources, Second Reading Speech),
available at http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/downloadhansard/la_2008.htm (select
“Book 12” under “Revised Book” for the month of September).
130. Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act, 2008, Pt. 1, Div. 1(1) (Vict.),
available at http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/ (follow “Victorian Statute Book” hyperlink;
then follow “2008” hyperlink; then follow “Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act
2008” hyperlink; then select.pdf file).
131. See generally id. (creating a system of exploration and injection leases and
banning GS activities from certain wilderness sites).
132. Id.
133. Id. pt. 1 § 3.
134. Id. pt. 2 § 14.
135. ELLISON, supra note 82, at 27 (citing Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R.
1.).
136. SAWER, supra note 82, at 174–75. For an overview of the doctrines of “tenure”
and “estates” see generally TOOHER & DWYER, supra note 87. Although the concept of
native title is beyond the scope of this analysis, the issue may further complicate endeavors to
secure rights in Australian subsurface formations since native title is “extinguished where the
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the Victorian Government is within its authority to include this provision.
The clear allocation of subsurface formation ownership to the government
establishes a monopoly on the “new resource” of underground
formations. This monopoly eliminates the risk of one surface owner
blocking storage in an entire formation137 and ensures more efficient
administration of the statute.138 Additionally, the GS industry is relieved
of the cautious necessity of extensive negotiations with every party who
may have an interest in a specific formation, however remote. Instead,
the GS industry is confronted with a single, predictable owner, the
government.
The Victorian GS Act increases certainty in the burgeoning GS industry
and provides a partial model for GS regulation because it clearly defines
underground geologic formation and allocates subsurface property rights.
This increased certainty reduces perceived industry risk and lowers
transaction costs resulting in a positive signal of clarity and certainty to
the burgeoning GS industry that is currently lacking in the United States.
IV. FEDERAL-LEVEL GS ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States produces three times as much coal as Australia.139
Like Australia, there is no enacted federal legislation140 related to global
warming prevention or CCS.141 There are, however, three important GSrelated developments in the United States, although none specifically
address subsurface formation ownership. First, the Interstate Oil and
Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC)142 released the Storage of Carbon

Crown appropriates Crown land for public purposes.” Id. at 7. The seminal case on
native title is Mabo v. Queensland II (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1. Id. at 5.
137. See supra text accompanying note 109.
138. However, it remains to be seen how the existence of subsurface formations that
cross state borders will be handled. A.M. Warburton & J.A. Grove, et al., Geosequestration
Law in Australia, in CLIMATE LAW IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 78, at 148–49.
139. WORLD COAL INST., supra note 4.
140. On January 28, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill as part of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that includes two significant provisions
relating to CCS: $2.4B in appropriations for CCS technology and tax credit increases for
energy research including CCS. UNITED STATES CARBON SEQUESTRATION COUNCIL,
S EQUESTRATION N EWS 1 (Feb. 2, 2009),http://www.southwestcarbonpartnership.org
/_Resources/PDF/SequestrationNews_February%202_2009.pdf.
141. Elizabeth C. Brodeen, Sequestration, Science and the Law: An Analysis of the
Sequestration Component of the California and Northeastern States’ Plans to Curb
Global Warming, 37 LEWIS & CLARK ENVTL. L. 1217, 1217 (2007).
142. According to the IOGCC’s website, “the Commission’s member states have
established effective regulation of the oil and natural gas industry through a variety of programs
designed to gather and share information, technologies and regulatory methods.” Interstate
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Dioxide in Geologic Structures: A Legal and Regulatory Guide for
States and Provinces (IOGCC Guide) in September of 2007.143 Second,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed a rulemaking
for a GS-specific well classification under the Underground Injection
Control (UIC) program in anticipation that the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA)144 will cover GS. And third, the DOE is funding geologic
sequestration pilot programs across the country.145
A. The IOGCC Guide
The IOGCC is “a multi-state government agency . . . work[ing] to ensure
[the] nation’s oil and natural gas resources are conserved and
maximized . . . .”146 The IOGCC Guide shares several concepts similar
to the Australian Guide. First, the IOGCC “envision[s] . . . a substantially
consistent system for the geologic storage of CO2 regulated at the
state . . . level in conformance with national and international law and
protocol.”147 Second, similar to the cooperative federalism seen in the
Australian Guide, the IOGCC concludes that the “jurisdiction, experience,
and expertise of states” render them “the most logical and experienced
regulators” of GS.148 And third, the IOGCC observes that current
regulatory frameworks might be modified to accommodate GS.149

Oil and Gas Compact Commission, About Us [hereinafter IOGCC Website], http://www.
iogcc.state.ok.us/history (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
143. According to the IOGCC Guide, the “report was prepared as an account of
work sponsored by an agency [the Department of Energy] of the United States Government. . . .
The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect
those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.” INTERSTATE OIL AND
GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC STRUCTURES: A
LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 2 (2007) [hereinafter
IOGCC GUIDE], http://groundwork.iogcc.org/sites/default/files/2008-CO2-Storage-Legal-andRegulatory-Guide-for-States-Full-Report.pdf.
144. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h–300h-8 (West 2009).
145. As a result of the recent enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act (Federal Stimulus Bill) over $8B in federal funds now support CCS technology.
Flurry of US State, Federal Policies Advance CCS, CARBON CAPTURE JOURNAL, Feb. 20,
2009, http://www.carboncapturejournal.com/displaynews.php?NewsID=344&PHPSESSID=
fp4t1fj6f62msb5jlfb8mllb66.
146. IOGCC Website, supra note 142.
147. IOGCC GUIDE, supra note 143, at 4.
148. Id. at 3.
149. Id.
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The IOGCC concludes that the varying legal treatment of subsurface
pore space among states can be reconciled by “clearly identifying the
surface owner as the person with the right to lease pore space for
storage . . . .”150 However, the model statute does not clearly identify
such ownership rights. Instead, the statute recommends that the state
regulating agency approve “use of a reservoir as a storage facility . . .
after public notice and hearing.”151 Property rights are only obliquely
referenced by the requirement that the state regulating agency find
“[t]hat a good faith effort has been made to obtain the consent of a
majority of the owners having property interests affected by the storage
facility. . . .”152
A footnote to the model statute explains that an “amalgamation of
property rights is absolutely necessary to properly permit, construct and
operate a . . . [GS] project.”153 Similar to the Victorian GS Act which
reserves rights in all subsurface formations to a single owner, the Crown,
the IOGCC model statute invokes eminent domain to solve the
fragmentation problem.154 The eminent domain clause provides in part
that “any storage operator is hereby empowered . . . to exercise the right
of eminent domain . . . to acquire all surface and subsurface rights and
interests necessary or useful” to operate a storage facility.155 Although
this may appear to be a simple and efficient solution, the model statute
does not address issues of just compensation that most certainly would
provide the basis for substantial litigation. The IOGCC recognizes the
requirement of clear ownership rights to facilitate GS, but perhaps fails
to take into consideration the risk of prohibitive litigation costs
associated with such broad authority for eminent domain.
B. EPA’s Proposed Class VI Well Rulemaking
The EPA published notification of a proposed rulemaking entitled
Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells

150. Id. at 22.
151. Id. at 33 (citing the Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide Model Statute,
§§ 3(a) and 3(a)(2)).
152. Id. (citing the Geologic Storage of Carbon Dioxide Model Statute, § 3(a)(2)).
153. Id. at 33 n.3.
154. See supra Part III.A.
155. IOGCC GUIDE, supra note 143, at 33 (citing the Geologic Storage of Carbon
Dioxide Model Statute, § 5(a)).
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(EPA’s Proposed Well Requirements) on July 25, 2008.156 This
rulemaking proposes creation of a Class VI Well for GS.157 However,
the EPA’s Proposed Well Requirements are narrowly focused on the
permitting issues associated with drilling wells for GS. This is an
important step in the overall process of establishing GS as a viable
industry, but the proposed rule will only apply to “owners or operators
of [GS] wells.”158 The owner or operator of a well is not necessarily the
same party with ownership of the subsurface formation. Therefore, this
proposed rule applies once ownership rights in the subsurface have been
established.
C. The WESTCARB Pilot Program
Although there is no federal legislation relating to GS, significant
funding has been provided by the DOE for pilot projects through
regional partnerships. In the fall of 2003, the DOE formed seven159
Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, “tasked with determining
the most suitable technologies, regulations, and infrastructure needs for
156. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg.
43492 (proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146).
157. At present, only pilot projects may be permitted under the existing regulatory
scheme as a Class V Well. See generally Dougherty & McLean, supra note 36, at 6.
Pilot projects may be drilled after obtaining a “Class V—experimental technology well”
permit. Id. at 5. Most class V wells are “shallow disposal systems.” U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Class V Wells, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/class5/index.html (last visited
Apr. 22, 2010). Since GS requires relatively deep wells, Class V is an awkward fit for
GS. For an excellent analysis of the awkward fit of GS into the UIC Program and
recommended modifications (before the proposed CCS well classification), see Moore,
supra note 5, at 462–65. Additionally, there is currently no UIC well classification that
covers commercial- scale deployment of GS technology and as such, commercial-scale
GS wells cannot legally be drilled under the UIC Program. It has been proposed that
Congress could remedy this obstacle “by exempting GS from the UIC program—as it
did for natural gas storage—and create an entirely new regulatory regime for GS.” Peter S.
Glaser et al, Global Warning Solutions: Regulatory Challenges and Common Law
Liabilities Associated with the Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 6 GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 429, 437 (2008).
158. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Lays Groundwork for Promising
Technologies to Help Mitigate Climate Change (July 15, 2008), http://yosemite.epa.gov/
opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/d35b72dfe481043b852574870
05e47cd!OpenDocument.
159. For more information on the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, see
NatCarb, Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships, http://www.natcarb.org/Atlas/partners.
html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
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carbon capture and sequestration in different regions of the U.S. and
Canada.”160 An example of one of the partnerships is WESTCARB,161
located in California and now in Phase III162 of the pilot program. Phase
III is a ten-year, large-volume CCS pilot project funded by the U.S.
Department of Energy and undertaken by the California Energy
Commission (CEC), Clean Energy Systems (CES), and various other
parties in Kern County, California.163 The pilot project will “inject
250,000 tons of CO2 per year for four years into a . . . saline formation
about 7,000 feet beneath a new . . . powerplant.”164
One of the primary purposes of WESTCARB III is to “address and
provide important information for evolving institutional, regulatory and
legal frameworks—[to] ‘frame the debate.’”165 CES owns the land upon
which the new powerplant will be built and below which the CO2 will be
sequestered.166 However, since ownership rights are clear, the WESTCARB
pilot project will not likely inspire much discussion of subsurface
formation ownership.
V. STATE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES—THE
CALIFORNIA EXAMPLE
Due to the enactment of Assembly Bill 32,167 it is of specific
importance that WESTCARB III will be located in California.168 By

160. Id.
161. West Coast Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, CO2 Sequestration,
http://www.westcarb.org/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
162. WESTCARB Phase III is also known as the “Kimberlina Test Facility.” WEST
COAST REGIONAL CARBON SEQUESTRATION PARTNERSHIP, PHASE III FACTSHEET 1,
http://www.westcarb.org/pdfs/PhaseIII_%20Factsheet.pdf.
163. Press Release, California Energy Commission, California Awarded $65
Million to Fight Global Warming Carbon Sequestration and Storage to Be Studied at
Bakersfield Pilot Site (May 6, 2008), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2008
_releases/2008-05-06_global_warming.html.
164. West Coast Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership, supra note 161.
165. Terry Surles, WESTCARB Development Director, Hawaii Natural Energy
Institute/Calif. Inst. For Energy & Environment, presentation at the WESTCARB Annual
Business Meeting (Nov. 27, 2007).
166. Telephone Interview with Alex Heney, Media Relations, Clean Energy Systems, in
Sacramento, Cal. (Dec. 10, 2008).
167. California Global Warming Solutions Act, C AL . H EALTH & S AFETY CODE
§§ 38500–38599 (West 2007).
168. To the extent that climate change is considered air pollution, it is primarily a
state concern. With the Enactment of the Air Quality Act of 1967, Congress expressly stated
“that air pollution prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local governments.” Air Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C
7401(a)(3) (2007); see also Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
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law, California must reduce its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by
2020.169 Tasked with implementation of this ambitious effort is the
California Air Resources Board (CARB).170 In the Climate Change
Proposed Scoping Plan, CARB specifically addresses geological storage
of carbon and comments that, “while more research and development
needs to occur, California should support . . . near-term advancement of
the technology . . . .”171 Without a well-designed legal and regulatory
system for CCS, this call for “support” is ineffective.
California has the opportunity to lead the United States and further the
goals of Assembly Bill 32 by recognizing a clearly established property
right in subsurface geologic formations. In California, real or immovable
property consists of land among other things.172 Further, land is defined
as,
The material of the earth, whatever may be the ingredients of which it is composed,
whether soil, rock or other substance, and includes free or occupied space for an
indefinite distance upwards as well as downwards, subject to limitations upon
the use of airspace imposed . . . . 173

Subsurface formations appear to fit squarely into the California
definition of land because the best-suited GS sites are comprised of
porous rock beneath a solid cap rock. However, application of these
statutes to GS is cumbersome and unenlightening at best.
The Ninth Circuit adheres to the figurative principle of ownership
from the heavens to the center of the earth,174 constrained only by the
ability to exert dominion over the property.175 Dominion over property
results from: (1) exclusive possession; and (2) reclamation from “the
general mass of the earth.”176 However, “without possession, no right . . .
446 (1960) (“Congressional recognition that the problem of air pollution is peculiarly a
matter of state and local concern is manifest in this [1955] legislation.”).
169. CAL. AIR RES. BD., supra note 23, at ES-1.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 116–17. CARB is contemplating a place for CCS within a larger,
proposed carbon trading scheme. This is evidenced by CARB’s emphasis on the need to,
“ensure an adequate framework is in place to provide credit for CCS projects when
appropriate.” Id. at 117.
172. CAL. CIV. CODE § 658 (2009).
173. Id. § 659.
174. Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Transp. Corp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936)
(“Th[e] formula ‘from the center of the earth to the sky’ . . . [is] a figurative phrase to express
the full and complete ownership of land . . . .”).
175. Id. at 758.
176. Id.
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can be maintained.”177 Because subsurface formations are large and lack
discrete boundaries, reducing them to “exclusive possession” is
impossible without purchasing large tracts of land. Additionally, the
value of subsurface formations is in their storage capacity or pore space.
Pore space is nothing more than “space” and cannot be “reclaimed” from
the earth. Therefore subsurface formations fall squarely outside of the
definition of “property” under a Ninth Circuit analysis.
Most modern cases reaffirm the “center of the earth” concept of
property ownership,178 especially in California. However, a few cases
outside of California illustrate a shift toward a more relaxed standard as
new technologies have stretched the limits of the imagination. For
example, an Ohio court explains that “ownership rights in today’s world
are not so clear-cut as they were before the advent of airplanes and
injection wells.”179 Perhaps there is room for modification of the “center
of the earth” theory as technology evolves.
A. Airspace Law
Airspace law illustrates the malleability of property rights when
confronted by technological innovation. GS is an innovative and
desirable technology that illuminates the previously uncontemplated
economic value of subsurface formations. Just as courts were confronted
with airspace rights and the desirability of commercial air travel,
subsurface formation ownership coupled with the desirability of GHG
mitigation is a legal issue of first impression. How far do these property
rights extend, now that their sudden usefulness has been established?
Historically, fragmentation of airspace risked impeding air transit.
Recognizing exclusive ownership in the column of upper airspace above
surface property would necessitate extensive negotiations for a single
flight path or risk myriad trespass suits. Exclusive ownership would
give millions of landowners “virtual veto power” over airplane travel in
direct contravention of the public good.180 To counter this risk, Congress
177. Id. (holding that “the very essence and origin of the legal right of property is
dominion over it. Property must have been reclaimed from the general mass of the earth,
and it must be capable by its nature of exclusive possession. Without possession, no right
in it can be maintained.”).
178. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979,
991 (2008).
179. Chance v. BP Chem., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (discussing
ownership of state waters beneath surface property).
180. Sprankling, supra note 178, at 1029–30 (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection
of the “heavens to the center of the earth” theory of ownership in U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 261 (1946)).
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gave the public freedom of transit in the upper airspace.181 In 1946, the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue and explained:
The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every
transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private claims to the
airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and
development in the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to
which only the public has a just claim.182

Property rights in airspace are therefore limited to the extent the airspace
is reasonably used by a surface property owner.183
By analogy to airspace rights, Congress and the courts have spoken to
the ownership issues raised by GS. Both airspace and the subsurface are
a public good. Desirable goals are furthered through public use of both
the airspace and the subsurface. Until the advent of the commercial
airplane, it was unimaginable that the upper airspace could be so
imminently useful. Similarly, prior to global awareness of climate change
and the subsequent evolution of mitigation technologies, very little
contemplation of the usefulness of subsurface formations had transpired.
Rather than force protracted negotiations with myriad landowners,
Congress may choose to establish the greater public good of GHG
mitigation strategies and reserve the subsurface formations solely for
public use. However, landowners would still be able to negotiate site
access and well locations.
Although this airspace analogy is persuasive and efficient, following
Victoria’s lead in reserving all rights in subsurface formations to the
government will be challenged on constitutional grounds in the United
States. A typical property owner will not find a use for the upper
airspace because there is no economic incentive to do so. A landowner
receives no value from permitting a commercial aircraft to cross the slice
of upper airspace above her property. However, in the context of GS
there is a strong economic incentive to negotiate use of subsurface
formations for sequestration activities. Firms subject to mandatory
emissions reductions will be willing to pay for GS if it is cheaper than
paying penalties associated with failing to meet a mandatory emissions
reduction target. Property owners will negotiate with these firms if they

181.
182.
183.

BERNHARDT & BURKHART, supra note 86, at 385.
U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
BERNHARDT & BURKHART, supra note 86, at 385.
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expect to profit. If the U.S. Government owns all subsurface formations,
firms will only have to negotiate with a single entity; but property
owners will be deprived of their ability to profit. This approach will not be
well received because of the volume and magnitude of takings proceedings
coupled with the complex task of providing just compensation184 for the
“taking” of subsurface property rights.
B. Water Law
A subcategory of subsurface formations is the saline aquifer. This
type of formation presents the largest possible storage capacity in the
United States and Canada.185 This vast, unused resource suffers from a
lack of case law on point with regard to ownership.186 In contrast to
injection of a substance into the ground for storage, the legal focus in
this area has typically been on ownership of the water itself for
consumption.187
Current law does not distinguish between saline aquifer and
“freshwater aquifer.”188 As a result, both are treated identically under
the law despite marked differences.189 Where freshwater aquifers are a
great resource and storage location for groundwater, the saline aquifer is
essentially useless to human beings. Saline aquifers contain water that is
diffuse, briny, and contains myriad dissolved compounds. It is illegal
for freshwater aquifers to be used for GS under the SDWA because
injected CO2 would contaminate groundwater.190 Injection of CO2 into
saline aquifers poses no such threat to groundwater and yet is treated
identically to freshwater aquifer contamination.
184. There are various issues related to quantification of actual damages
and just compensation to the property owner. Since the government would own all
subsurface formations, it will be difficult to quantify the value of a subsurface formation
in the absence of a market reference price. Furthermore, government ownership of such
a substantial amount of property would result in significant exposure to lawsuits ranging
from groundwater contamination to liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liablity Act of 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
186. MARK A. DE FIGUEIREDO, PROPERTY INTERESTS AND LIABILITY OF GEOLOGIC
CARBON DIOXIDE STORAGE: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE MIT CARBON SEQUESTRATION
INITIATIVE 9 (2005).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. “All injection must be authorized under either general rules or specific permits.
Injection well owners and operators may not site, construct, operate, maintain, convert,
plug, abandon, or conduct any other injection activity that endangers USDWs [underground
sources of drinking water].” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Basic Information About Injection
Wells, http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw000/uic/basicinformation.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
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As a result, state water law may govern ownership of subsurface
saline formations191 due to improper categorization with freshwater
aquifers used to store groundwater. Groundwater is stringently regulated
under the SDWA192 and may have an influence on saline formation
ownership.193 The exact nature of this influence is unclear because
groundwater law is not designed to address subsurface formation
ownership.194
Water law is an awkward fit for GS because its sole concern is water
rights, not the real property ownership rights associated with where the
water is located. Specifically, water law is not directly applicable to GS
because “state groundwater law has generally arisen in the context of
withdrawals from valuable freshwater aquifers rather than injections into
the largely valueless saline aquifers.”195 Although GS involves sequestering
CO2 within water-saturated subsurface formations, water law provides
no regulatory guidance regarding ownership of the formations themselves.
The people of California own all water located within the state196 and
it provides an example of regulatory silence regarding ownership of
subsurface formations. Section 10752(a) of the California Water Code
defines groundwater as “all water beneath the surface of the earth within
the zone below the water table in which the soil is completely saturated
with water, but does not include water which flows in known and
definite channels.”197 The briny water within a saline aquifer is covered
by this definition but not the subsurface formation itself.198
If the people own all water, it logically follows that saline formations
are also the property of the people. However, state “ownership” of
groundwater is understood to be ownership “in a regulatory, supervisory

191. FIGUEIREDO, supra note 186, at 8; Glaser et al., supra note 157, at 439 (“[deep
saline aquifer] formation ownership will likely be determined by state groundwater law.”).
192. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h –300h-8 (West 2009).
193. FIGUEIREDO, supra note 186, at 3.
194. For example, EPA’s Proposed Well Requirements do not address subsurface
formation ownership. See supra text accompanying note 157.
195. Glaser et al., supra note 157, at 439.
196. CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (2009).
197. Id. § 10752(a) (2009).
198. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting to note that
once CO2 is injected into the subsurface formation and sequestered in the pore space and/or
dissolved in the briny water, it may be considered “groundwater” for purposes of California
Water Law.
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sense . . . not . . . in a possessory, proprietary sense.”199 Clearly the state
does not have possessory ownership rights in groundwater, but the
California Supreme Court has explained that neither does the surface
owner. The California Supreme Court construed section 102 to mean
that a property owner did not own the “groundwater, surface water, and
aquifers on and surrounding” his property.200 If the state does not have
possessory ownership and the surface owner does not own aquifers
beneath his property, it is not clear that any party owns a proprietary
interest in California groundwater.201
Amending the current definition of “groundwater” to specifically
exclude saline aquifers resolves the ambiguous applicability of water law
to GS. However, such an amendment does not clarify ownership rights.
Merely establishing that GS reservoirs are not subject to water law does
not provide any information regarding the reservoir’s owner. Additionally,
California enacted the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
through initiative in 1986.202 This measure requires some of the most
stringent regulations in the nation with regard to toxic chemicals and
groundwater contamination. The perceived risks of groundwater
contamination resulting from GS activities will likely inspire significant
public attention and concern. As a result, the legislature is not likely to
exclude saline aquifers and in the absence of a separate GS regulatory
regime, the applicability of water law to GS will remain unsettled.
C. Property Rights—Defining the Mineral Estate
Subsurface formations suitable for GS are currently a legally
unrecognized mineral resource. Amending existing mineral law to
199. State v. Super. Ct. of Riverside County, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 287–88 (Ct. App.
2000).
200. AIU Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 799 P.2d 1253, 1261 (1990).
201. Presuming water law applies to GS for the purpose of entertaining an analogy,
California subscribes to the “correlative rights rule” with regard to groundwater.
FIGUEIREDO, supra note 186, at 10. Setting direct subsurface ownership rights issues
aside and presuming water law would apply, this rule “holds that a land owner may use
groundwater in proportion to its surface ownership.” Glaser et al., supra note 157, at 439.
This concept has been “extended by the doctrine of mutual prescription [to] allocat[e]
water by comparing reasonableness of use based on such factors as custom, social utility,
safe yield, and need.” FIGUEIREDO, supra note 186, at 10–11 (citing City of Pasadena v.
City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 33 (1949)). Applying this rule to GS would permit
landowners to store GS in subsurface formations in proportion to their ownership of the
surface. Certainly GS provides “social utility” in the form of reduced GHG emissions.
However, determining one landowner’s degree of “need” for GS beneath his property could
prove difficult. There is a risk that various landowners with a profit motive might attempt to
show a greater “need” to store more carbon beneath their property through litigation.
202. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25249.13 (2009).
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create a new mineral right in subsurface formations instantly results in a
familiar regulatory framework and body of common law applicable to
GS by analogy.
There is no single definition of “mineral estate.”203 In fact, courts have
generally considered the meaning of “mineral estate” to be uncertain and
indefinite.204 A suitable subsurface GS formation includes two basic
requirements covered by this broad, cross-categorical characterization of
“other minerals”: porous rock and cap rock. This elastic definition of
“other minerals” has allowed courts to “accommodat[e] substances that
rather recently have acquired greatly increased economic value.”205
Subsurface formations are not “substances.” However, large-scale
deployment of GS renders the previously valueless subsurface formations
an important resource, thereby greatly increasing their economic value.
Since courts have historically expanded or narrowed the mineral estate
from time to time,206 judicial or legislative expansion to accommodate
subsurface formations presents an excellent option for regulation.
In the Australian Guide, the MCMPR recommends that GS-specific
legislation take the form of amendments to existing oil and gas law
rather than the whole cloth creation of a new regulatory regime.207 In
the absence of legislative direction, courts will construct a place within
the mineral estate for ownership of subsurface formations.
Categorizing a subsurface formation as a “mineral” turns on the
definition of “substance.” Merriam-Webster defines “substance” as “matter
of particular or definite chemical constitution.”208 The term “mineral
rights” often contemplates substances that stretch this traditional
understanding. For example, “gravel, clay, granite, sandstone, coal, lignite,
surplus salt water, iron ore . . . uranium, fissionable materials, subterranean
water, helium, carbon dioxide,209 and geothermic matter such as hot

203. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 8 (3d ed. 1991).
204. Id. at 11.
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. AUSTL. GUIDE, supra note 93, at 32.
208. Merriam-Webster OnLine, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substance
(last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
209. HEMINGWAY, supra note 203, at 9. Because it is beyond the scope of this Comment,
we must set aside the question of whether a mineral estate owner, in conveying his grant
of “oil, gas and other minerals” would be interpreted as conveying any CO2 that had been
sequestered beneath his property.
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water and steam . . .” have been considered “all other minerals.”210
Subsurface formations are a substance because they are comprised of
porous rock with “particular chemical constitution.”211
Subsurface formations are a separate mineral estate interest because
they meet the most common requirements examined by courts in
deciding the issue. Subsurface formations reasonably could be found to
“possess [the] exceptional characteristic or peculiar property”212 of being
suitable for GS. Such suitability might then be found to give the subsurface
formation “a special value apart from the land itself.”213 Further,
subsurface formations are not “traditionally associated with surface
ownership, or . . . considered essential or beneficial to the utilization of
the surface of the land.”214 As a result, subsurface formations assimilate
nicely into the current body of mineral law.
D. Oil and Gas Law
Subsurface formations such as GS-suitable saline formations are large
and do not have discrete boundaries because they are permeable rock
formations.215 As a result, concurrent injection of CO2 into the same
formation is likely to result. Similar to oil and gas law,216 it is difficult
to determine from which location among many the CO2 stored within a
subsurface formation originated. Where oil and gas law focus on
extraction—and sometimes storage—of a valuable commodity, GS
involves capture of a pollutant and its injection into the earth. Therefore,
any examination of oil and gas law as an analogy requires it to be
applied in reverse to GS.
In oil and gas law, for example, the fundamental “rule of capture”
assigns title to oil and gas drained from beneath another’s property to the
party who produced it.217 In GS activities this rule would assign title to a
subsurface formation by the first person or entity to discover and inject
CO2 into it. Alternatively, California follows the minority, “non ownership”

210. Id.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 58–62.
212. HEMINGWAY, supra note 203, at 12.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 12–13.
215. Id.
216. “Oil and gas are fugacious; they may move from place to place within sedimentary
rock. In addition, oil and gas are fungible; it is difficult to determine whether a certain
MCF of gas or barrel of oil produced has been drawn from under one tract of land or
another.” JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8 (3d ed. 1995).
217. Id. at 9.
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theory of oil and gas.218 This theory holds that “the owner of oil and gas
rights [does] not own oil or gas until it [has] been controlled by capture
in a well.”219 Therefore, if subsurface formations exist below surface
property, the surface owner has the right to sequester carbon, but not
until she actually starts doing so. Either approach is an effective means
of allocating ownership rights in subsurface formations but neither
addresses the fragmentation problem.
Under California oil and gas law, the fragmentation problem is addressed
through mandatory pooling agreements. The concept of pooling “usually
describes the joining together of tracts [of land] in order to receive a
drilling permit under the applicable well spacing rule for the area.”220
Considering a subsurface reservoir to be a “pool” for the purposes of this
analogy, California’s mandatory pooling statute could be modified to
address GS. Landowners could also voluntarily pool their property
rights to a single subsurface formation and negotiate storage fees in
proportion to their surface ownership.
Mandatory pooling can be required in California to “prevent waste”
and increase “recovery of oil or gas,”221 and is a model for amalgamation
of property rights for GS purposes. Additionally, the California Public
Resources Code specifies that “a well spacing plan apply[ing] to the
surface and subsurface of a designated pool . . . [may require that] all or
certain specified parcels of land shall be included in [the] pooling . . .
agreement.”222 Presuming there will be GS well spacing requirements,
for example, a mandatory pooling requirement could force surface
landowners to combine their interests in the same subsurface formation.
This would streamline storage access negotiations. Additionally, such a
pooling agreement could help ensure that only a single well is drilled
over a specific subsurface formation and reduce the risk of competing
interests from multiple wells sequestering carbon in the same geologic
formation.

218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 28.
220. Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing
With Uncooperative Owners, 7 U. UTAH J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255, 255 n.1 (1986).
221. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3609 (2009).
222. Id. (emphasis added).

593

LOGAN ARTICLE FINAL EDITS 4-25 (1) (DO NOT DELETE)

5/4/2010 4:31 PM

E. Natural Gas Storage
The storage of natural gas223 appears to be the most likely applicable
analogy to GS because of the technical similarities.224 However, there
are two main points of distinction:225 natural gas storage is exempt from the
UIC program under the SDWA,226 and natural gas is a valuable commodity.
By contrast, the EPA’s Proposed Well Requirements signal that EPA
contemplates jurisdiction227 over GS wells. Additionally, stored CO2 is
essentially pollution; the value is in the subsurface formation’s ability to
sequester it. However, similarities related to risk of groundwater
contamination and technological storage specifications warrant further
examination.
It is not likely that GS will be exempted from the UIC if the EPA’s
Proposed Well Requirements become a formal rule because CO2 is not a
“natural gas.” Determinations of administrative agencies in interpreting

223. To be clear, CO2 is not considered a natural gas under the Underground
Injection Control Program, nor under the Safe Drinking Water Act. Moore, supra note
5, at 462. The purpose of this analysis is to examine regulation that may be the nearest
available model, by analogy, for GS of CO2.
224. Compare JAMES E. MIELKE & JOSEPH P. RIVA, JR., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF NATURAL GAS iii, CRS-4
(Cong. Research Service: The Library of Cong. 1988) (“Storing natural gas underground
involves containing the gas within the pore structure of a large volume of porous and
permeable rock enclosed by an impermeable cap rock.”), with supra text accompanying
notes 60–64 (a suitable potential GS reservoir “is composed of porous rock” and “capped
by one or more . . . impermeable rock formations.”).
225. There is another point of distinction worth mentioning. Natural gas is piped
interstate and is therefore regulated at the federal level by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC). At this juncture, it is premature—although not impossible—to assume
that FERC will have jurisdiction over GS activities. It remains to be seen whether storage
locations will require interstate transport of CO2 or whether large subsurface formations
will cross state lines and trigger FERC jurisdiction.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
227. Since GS sequesters CO2 that would otherwise be emitted into the air and
covered under the provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA), it is likely that the EPA will
have authority to regulate GS activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2006). The U.S.
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Massachusetts v. EPA held that it is within the
authority of the EPA under the CAA to regulate CO2 emissions from new motor vehicles
“in the event [EPA] forms a ‘judgment’ that such emissions contribute to climate change.”
549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). Although not directly on point, the Massachusetts case provides
support that the EPA will likely have authority to regulate CO2 emissions if found to
contribute to climate change. On December 15, 2009, EPA published an endangerment
finding for six greenhouse gases including CO2. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66496 (Dec. 15, 2009).
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and implementing federal legislation are given deference by the courts.228
With respect to CO2, the Tenth Circuit upheld a decision by the EPA “to
regulate the disposal of [CO2] waste fluids—including underground
injection.”229 Specifically, the court “upheld the administrative interpretation
that [CO2] is not ‘natural gas’ within the meaning” of well classifications
in the code of federal regulations.230
Despite the likelihood that CO2 will not be exempt under the SDWA,
it is still helpful to examine the current state of natural gas storage law.
The complexities of underground natural gas storage are best illuminated
by Kuntz’ recommended approach to securing such rights:
Because the cases on [this] subject are few in number and are not in harmony,
when a subsurface stratum is acquired for storage purposes, the grant should be
taken from the person having the right to extract the particular substance to be
stored, the surface owner and the owner of any other mineral rights. Prudence
also dictates that grants be secured from mineral owners of any separate strata
not acquired whose rights of access might be impaired, from owners of various
surface interests and from owners of easements or other similar interests whose
rights might be impaired in some way.231

This recommendation provides an illuminating roadmap through the
complexities inherent in subsurface property rights related to GS from a
contractual perspective. Despite the complexities, the GS industry may
take solace in the existence of a functioning natural gas storage industry.
Although the law in this area is complex, it is not prohibitive—with the
proper economic incentives. The existence of “special statutory provisions
for condemnation of subsurface structures for gas storage” in various

228. When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
229. Arco Oil & Gas Co. v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 14 F.3d 1431, 1437–38 (10th
Cir. 1993) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (West 1993)).
230. Id. at 1437.
231. 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 75 (1987).
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states232 may provide a model for regulating GS233 because current
regulatory frameworks could be amended to cover GS.
F. Eminent Domain234 and Condemnation
The IOGCC model statute suggests eminent domain proceedings to
acquire ownership of subsurface formations where there is a fragmentation
issue.235 Taking this suggestion a step further would be to follow the
Victorian model236 and render subsurface formations state property.237
With such a monopoly, the state government may best be able to
regulate GS. Where the subsurface formations cross state borders and
injection sites are present in each state, the mingling of CO2 in the
reservoir is a function of interstate commerce. As a result, establishment
of a uniform system of state-based administration under federal direction
provides regulatory oversight of GS operations, and is consistent with
the notion of dual sovereignty inherent in the UIC program authorized
by the SDWA.238
232. Id. at 77–78.
233. For an excellent analysis of major issues related to federal condemnations for
underground natural gas storage rights that outlines issues that will likely also be faced
by GS including valuation and extent of property owner’s rights to subsurface geologic
formations, see generally Steven D. McGrew, Selected Issues in Federal Condemnations
for Underground Natural Gas Storage Rights: Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation,
and Trespass, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 131 (2000).
234. The focus of this Comment is on determining initial ownership rights. Since
eminent domain can only be addressed “once ownership issues have been determined”
full eminent domain analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. Mark A. de Figueiredo,
Property Interests and Liability of Geologic Carbon Dioxide Storage, in CARBON
CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION: INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY, MONITORING, AND REGULATION
243, 244 (Elizabeth J. Wilson & David Gerard eds., 2007).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 156–157.
236. See supra text accompanying note 136.
237. Notably, state ownership of subsurface formations would also alleviate the
issue of subsurface trespass inherent in private ownership. Further, the issue of permanent
long-term storage of the sequestered CO2 could be remedied by enacting legislation
similar to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2006). This Act
transferred ultimate title of nuclear waste to the Federal Government as it was determined that
“Federal ownership and management of such [a] site is necessary or desirable in order to
protect the public health and safety, and the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 10171(b)(1)(C)
(2006). With a finite end to liability for sequestered carbon, it is more likely that firms
would invest in the technology. For a detailed discussion of a CCS-specific liability regime,
see Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration:
Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 EMORY L. J.
103 (2008).
238. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-1 (West 2009). The relationship between federal and state
governments under this type of program is characterized as “dual sovereignty.” James R.
May, Of Happy Incidents, Climate, Federalism, and Preemption, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 465, 471 (2008). State primacy is preserved through the power to implement
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Should Congress express its intent that states pursue condemnation of
subsurface formations for GS purposes, it would be at the behest of the
states to amend existing law or create a new statutory regime. In
California, for example, the Public Utilities Code permits condemnation
of “any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of” a
gas or electric plant.239 Further, the 1975 Law Revision Commission
explains that,
Section 612 grants an “electrical corporation” (defined in Section 218) the right
of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and
maintenance of its electric plant. “Electric plant” is defined in Section 217 to
mean in substance all property devoted to public use in the production,
generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity for light, heat, or
power. Thus, Section 612 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary
to carry out the regulated activities of the electrical corporation.240

To facilitate GS, the Public Utilities Code could be amended to include
GS formations as “property devoted to public use” that is “necessary to
carry out” the GHG mitigation goals from Assembly Bill 32.
What comprises a “public use” is largely dependent upon specific
facts and circumstances and requires a case-by-case inquiry.241 Further,
“public use” has been defined as “a use which concerns the whole community
or promotes the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of
government.”242 Most relevant to GS is that a public use “may extend to
matters of public health, recreation and enjoyment.”243 Nothing would
appear more appropriate as a “public use” than GHG mitigation. Climate
change concerns a “whole community” and has dire implications with
regard to “public health, recreation and enjoyment.”
Broadening the doctrine of eminent domain in this respect is not
politically feasible in the United States without public acceptance of the
exigencies of climate change. The public is frustrated by “the legal
confusion engulfing the definition of public use and legal setbacks for

and enforce standards while the Environmental Protection Agency retains the power to
set federal “technology-based performance standards.” Id.
239. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 612–613 (2009).
240. CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N, THE EMINENT DOMAIN LAW 1001, 1017–18 (1975),
available at http://clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub118.pdf.
241. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 646 P.2d 835, 841 (1982) (citing Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159–60 (1896)).
242. Id. (quoting Bauer v. Ventura County, 45 Cal.2d 276, 284 (1955)).
243. Id.
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advocates of private property rights in courts around the nation. . . .”244
This has resulted in “an ever-increasing public outcry against many, if
not most, exercises of eminent domain.”245 Condemning subsurface
formations for GS would be the largest eminent domain action in U.S.
history. As such, any attempt would likely be met with constitutional
challenges, additional cost-prohibitive litigation, and just compensation
costs. Although this approach would clearly allocate property rights,
this approach will not succeed without a tidal sea change in public
opinion.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
There is no obvious solution to clarifying ownership rights in
subsurface formations suitable for GS. Through federal-level guidance
and individual state action, Australia is cultivating a regulatory and legal
environment to help invite GS investment and increase confidence in the
industry. Combining these international developments with current U.S.
law and guidance can provide a partial model for future action in the
United States and crystallize the need for the clear identification of
subsurface property rights.
Australia and the United States differ in many respects yet share some
important similarities. Both countries have significant coal reserves, are
heavily dependent on coal-fired power generation, and are becoming
more cognizant of the need to take action to reduce GHG emissions.
Additionally, both the MCMPR and IOGCC observe that clarity with
regard to subsurface ownership rights is essential in the development of
a regulatory regime for GS.
The recommendation most congruent with settled U.S. law and the
American respect for private property follows the approach suggested in
both the Australian Guide and the IOGCC Guide. This approach involves
amending existing statutes to directly address subsurface formation
ownership in the context of GS. In this scenario, the federal government
issues guidance to the states with the same goal as the MCMPR in the
Australian Guide: a consistent national approach to GS legislation.
Although ownership rights are allocated to the surface owner, states
maintain ultimate discretion in choosing a regulatory approach. This
results in different legal regimes for each state jurisdiction and requires
firms to negotiate with every party with any interest in the subsurface.
244. Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237, 240 (2006).
245. Id.
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Although costs would be higher under this approach, courts have confronted
and successfully resolved analogous legal issues of first impression, and
a body of common law would develop.
The second recommendation is more efficient but less politically
feasible. Following the Victorian model, ownership of subsurface
formations is allocated to individual states as a public good. Although it
goes against the grain of the American appreciation for personal property, a
government monopoly on subsurface formations increases predictability
and reduces transaction costs. Under this regime, firms interested in GS
would be required to negotiate with a single owner—the state—rather
than all parties with any interest in the subsurface. The resulting clarity
of ownership rights in combination with a standardized government
negotiation process significantly increases certainty in the industry. The
success of this approach turns on public opinion regarding the relative
importance of mitigating GHG emissions and the government’s ability to
defend against constitutional challenge and provide just compensation.
GS presents novel subsurface ownership issues that must be addressed
in any related U.S. regulatory framework. Predictability and certainty in
this regard will provide regulatory clarity and encourage investment in
what is currently a legal and regulatory vacuum. GS could provide one
of the many small advantages necessary to mitigate GHG emissions. Yet
without clearly established property rights inspiring certainty in the
industry, we can be certain only that the GHG mitigation potential of
large-scale GS deployment will remain unrealized.
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